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Introduction: 
 
Science Fiction’s Existential Dilemma 
 
 
A group of blind men touch an elephant in the dark. However, they 
are not familiar with the creature. In an effort to understand its complete 
form, each one feels a different part, but only one part: one blind man 
describes the tusk like a curved horn; another claims the trunk is like a live 
tree branch; a third hugs a leg which he describes as a pillar. Yet, when the 
men try to arrive at a consensus of the creature’s entirety, they completely 
disagree. Their perspectives and conjectures render incompatible. This 
parable traces a long oral tradition across cultures, and befittingly extends 
to the formidable task of defining Science Fiction (SF). 
 The debate concerning the proper definition of SF is extensive. 
Ironically, the inaugural edition of the The Encyclopedia of Science 
Fiction (1979) by John Clute and Peter Nicholls gave over twenty 
definitions1. By 1993 the editorial staff had only whittled the definitions 
down to eleven, where that number remains today (Fowler 1). Most 
surprisingly, Clute and Nicholls admit irresolution in their conclusion 
regarding the definition of SF, stating:  
“There is really no good reason to expect that a workable 
definition of SF will ever be established. Historically, it grew from 
the merging of many distinct genres, from utopias to space 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Including Hugo Gernsback’s first description of ‘scientifiction’ which first appeared 
Science Wonder Stories (June 1929) where he described SF as the “Jules Verne, H.G. 
Wells and Edgar Allen Poe type of story—a charming romance intermingled with 
scientific fact and prophetic vision…”	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adventures. Instinctively, however, we may feel that if SF ever 
loses its sense of fluidity of the future through basic conceptual 
vagueness, then the center of its structure may implode.” (314) 
While declaring SF will never have an established definition is 
defeatist, the majority of current SF definitions are primarily 
unsatisfactory for two reasons:  
1) Most attempts to define SF can be too contrived, metaphorical, 
and exhaustive; they only further complicate the definitive intent. For 
instance, Robert Scholes is a Yale and Cornell-educated literary theorist 
who attempted to substitute Science Fiction’s denomination in 1975 in his 
academic essay, “Structural Fabulation.” In Scholes’ pursuit to broaden 
the boundaries of what literature constituted the SF moniker, he defined 
structural fabulation as: 
“…a fiction radically discontinuous to our known world, modified 
by an awareness of the universe as a system of systems, a structure 
of structures.” (4) 
While noble in aspiration, the definition fails to narrow SF’s objective, 
constitution, and is bluntly an amorphous conception. Scholes’ structural 
fabulation only elucidates SF as an alienated and orphaned genre, but not 
as a distinct category with an established rubric. 
2) SF definitions can be shallow, inconclusive, and often miss 
something crucial. Firstly, one cannot say that SF is realism because it is 
not limited to the methods of realistic description, plot devices, or 
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characters. For opposing reasoning, SF cannot be classified as mythic 
(which includes Fantasy and Epic poetry) since it does not structurally 
operate in a synchronic or “timeless” dimension to preserve a specific 
cultural or religious didacticism; SF operates in worlds that are not 
absolute and where narrative variables change. Mythology’s repetitive 
universe is often static, and therefore anti-empirical: it inherently adopts 
an unreasonable, ironclad universe and refutes the scientific method 
applied with SF (Panshin 3). Additionally, SF cannot be classified as 
modern myth because it purposefully severs classical mythical ties. To 
illustrate, Victor Frankenstein’s Monster can easily be viewed as an 
evolution of the Golem: an animated anthropomorphic being created from 
clay. However, the Golem is dumb while Frankenstein’s Monster is 
distinctively depicted by Shelley to be more intelligent than its creator. 
Nor is it fair to compare SF to Fantasy, where the latter genre disregards 
the laws of the author's empirical world and escapes into an elementary, 
collateral realm indifferent toward plausibility. Lastly, SF cannot be 
purely described as ‘technological-scientific fiction’; this terminology 
would be more aligned with the aims of a scientific essay, where the sole 
purpose is hypothetical speculation without an accompanying narrative. 
Jules Verne, for example, tends to fall into this trap of scientific pedagogy, 
where his SF narratives are encumbered and diluted by voluminous, and 
mostly anthropological observations.  
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At its core, SF has typically been characterized as the 
literature of “What if…” or as famed SF author, Isaac Asimov, declared as 
a “literature of ideas.” Yet this conceit is as vague as the aforementioned 
definitions. All literature is an extrapolation of an idea—all forms of 
fiction depict “What if…” scenarios. Others have concluded SF composes 
narratives of the future, but most SF is often set in the present or an 
alternate history.2   
SF may be difficult to define because it engages a problem of 
singular genre classification: is SF a genre subset or does it command a 
explicit narrative autonomy? Can SF be considered a Victorian Gothic 
incarnation, or does its roots stem further back? When exactly did SF 
become an independent genre? And how did SF, much like any budding 
genre, garner its own umbrella? 
The purpose of this essay is not solely to define a distinct 
chronology of SF, but to systematize how the SF genre formed and 
distinguished itself. To accomplish this, I will identify and analyze two of 
the most cohesive, catalytic works which propelled the SF genre into self-
sufficiency: Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel, Frankenstein; or, The Modern 
Prometheus (i.e. Frankenstein), and the Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. 
Clarke 1968 film collaboration on 2001: A Space Odyssey (i.e. 2001).3 SF 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This can also be generically said for any fictional narrative, regardless of genre.	  	  3	  Written simultaneously, both 2001’s screenplay and novelization influenced each other 
and were paralleled to match Kubrick’s ultimate production exhibited on screen; while 
minor differences are apparent, the film’s screenplay and visuals will be cited to 
encompass the seminal themes of this essay.	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is a hyper-visualized medium, where a large percentage of its narrative, 
unlike other genres, is dedicated to world building. Consequently, it only 
seems appropriate to incorporate the cinematic aspect of SF. But both 
works, in each narrative medium, are indubitably the most coherent forms 
that all other SF works can aspire and be compared. Yet in order to 
establish SF as an independent genre, I will first examine the derivation of 
its conventions cannibalized from mythology, epic poetry, fantasy, the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism movements, and gothic romance/horror. 
After isolating and defining SF’s core tenets, which include empiricism 
and Darko Suvin’s Cognitive Estrangement Theory, Shelley’s cautionary 
story of creation is proven to inaugurate a new literary era. The genre then 
extended its foothold with the cinematic achievement of Kubrick-Clarke’s 
2001. Utilizing the existential use of stylistic devices, particularly the 
grotesque and sublime, both works explore the impact and inclusion of 
scientific perspectives in fiction. But most innovatively, these SF works 
imbued the grotesque and the sublime conceits into self-reflective 
archetypes neologized as ‘genremorphs.’ These genremorphs broke the 
fourth wall to ruminate on SF’s agency, while subversively shepherded 
readers through the genre’s strange new landscape, laws, and addressed 
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Chapter 1: 
Literary Origins: From Supernaturalism to Science 
 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein arguably gestated the first coherent 
and competent science-fictional form during the early 19th century. Most 
scholars will concede that while Shelley’s well-documented intention was 
crafting a horror story to spook and impress her bookish peers, she 
inadvertently leaped into a new age of storytelling. She certainly 
benefitted from the good luck of having parents who were intellectual 
savants and to have married a great poet, Percy Shelley, with whose 
influence allowed Frankenstein to slip amongst publishers favoring 
Romanticist literature. Frankenstein was retroactively elevated by the 
contextual, sociopolitical, and technological changes occurring at the time. 
Scientific influences are blatant throughout the novel, which fused 
Shelley’s canonical knowledge and her inquisitive preoccupation in 
emerging science; it was a marriage that, above all else, challenged a 
pervasive religious dogma in favor of scientific rationality.  
SF Author and scholar, Brian Aldiss, presents the best case for 
Shelley as SF’s first complete author in his authoritative history of the 
genre, Billion Year Spree (reiterated in his updated, Trillion Year Spree). 
He cites Shelley’s inclusions of Milton, Goethe, and Erasmus Darwin as a 
conscious testimony that she is not just another Gothic novelist:  
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We can see the Faustian theme is brought dramatically up to date, 
with science replacing supernatural machinery… Frankenstein 
touches not only science but man’s dual nature, whose inherited 
ape curiosity has brought him both success and misery. (36) 
Shelley’s tale, as Aldiss claimed, was a “Model-T SF drama with 
philosophical interludes” (iv). Memorable epiphanies were coupled with 
great naturalistic and narrative expanses, tundras, and other formidable 
earthly forces. Shelley exercised her intuitive perception of science, 
viewing it as a powerful entity, but also recognized the dangers of its 
advancement if uncontrolled.  
In this consideration, her writing was ingrained within the 
quotidian mindset of people living and struggling to adapt to an 
industrialized world, and how they feared losing control in a postindustrial 
near-future. Shelley recognized that in order for the public consciousness 
to adopt radically different doctrines, they must fully comprehend 
scientific methodologies and its potential benefits.   
Frankenstein incorporates many discoveries of the 17th, 18th, and 
19th centuries, specifically the revolutionary discovery of electricity. 
While Benjamin Franklin would be the most renowned polymath who 
studied the scientific properties of electricity in the 1700s, other 
innovators within the medical community attracted Shelley’s interest. She 
particularly gravitated to the research on animal electricity conducted by 
Luigi Galvani, a professor of Medicine and Anatomy at the University of 
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Bologna. In 1786, Luigi Galvani discovered that severed frog’s legs 
twitched when he conducted an electric charge to them (Krischel). Galvani 
regarded these studies of animal electricity and dubbed its vital force 
“Galvanism.” Galvani died in 1798, and his nephew, Giovanni Aldini, 
Professor of Physics at the University of Bologna, continued to defend his 
uncle’s interpretation of animal electricity. Between 1800 and 1810, 
Aldini traveled through Europe (including Shelley’s hometown of Somers 
Town, London) and performed electrical experiments on corpses. At the 
Royal College of Surgeons in London, Aldini galvanized the body of John 
Forster, a local inmate who had been executed for murder. Aldini 
proceeded to connect electrodes to Forster’s body, where “the jaw began 
to quiver, the adjoining muscles were horribly contorted, and the left eye 
actually opened” (Hindle 17). An application of electrodes to the ear and 
rectum “excited in the muscle[s] contractions much stronger than in the 
preceding experiments, [so as] almost to give an appearance of re-
animation.” (18). Shelley’s description of Frankenstein’s Monster’s 
animation, which was published 15 years after Aldini’s account, is 
remarkably similar. Yet Shelley used the concept of reanimation and 
electricity to accentuate humanity’s duality, not as a shock and awe gambit 
or an imaginary abomination.  
Generally, scientific experiments are performed with altruistic 
intentions in mind. Yet a reverse, commonly negative affect is nearly 
always introduced. Just as science can end up creating dual reactions, say 
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nuclear power for fission energy or the atomic bomb, electricity holds this 
same dynamism more directly: electricity wields the power of magnetism, 
negative and positive forces pulling away from each other. Shelley 
appropriated electricity's duality to Frankenstein, most significantly to Dr. 
Victor Frankenstein’s motives as they vacillated between magnanimous 
and self-serving. Shelley established Victor as an informed wanderer 
between worlds, transcending Victorian prudence into scientific 
enlightenment, but not yet immune to encountering its perils. 
While SF clearly borrows elements from mythology, fantasy, and 
epic poetry4, SF channels the spirit of empirical knowledge with what 
English professor and SF anthologist, Eric S. Rabkin, termed “the 
scientific habits of mind” (3). Victor Frankenstein valued empirical 
knowledge for its altruistic means to “…search [for] the philosopher’s 
stone and the elixir of life… banish disease from the human frame, and 
render man invulnerable…” (34). But philosophy would fail Victor in 
producing concrete results, so we follow him as he searches elsewhere. 
Shelley purposefully dedicates a substantial portion of the text to establish 
Victor’s scientific credibility and dedication to empiricism. Victor 
transitions from metaphysics and philosophy, considered the “softer” 
sciences, to natural law (specifically chemistry). Subtextually through 
Victor Frankenstein, Shelley proposes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Both Frankenstein’s subtitle references Greek Mythology and its epigraph quotes 
Adam’s post-fall lamentation of God in Milton’s Paradise Lost	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 In other studies you go as far as others have gone before you, and 
there is nothing more to know; but in a scientific pursuit there is 
continual food for discovery and wonder. (47)  
Victor “…delighted in investigating the facts relative to the actual world,” 
and believed true intellectual transformation “…required [one] to 
exchange chimeras of boundless grandeur for realities…” (31, 43). This 
was the only way to “pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and 
unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation” (4). Additionally, 
Shelley recruits Victor’s Professor of Natural Philosophy at Ingolstadt, M. 
Krempe, to encourage his student in dismissing alchemy, mysticism, and 
antiquated spiritual teachers who “…promised impossibilities and 
performed nothing,” and to instead: 
“…Pour over the microscope, penetrate into the recesses of 
nature…command the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, 
and even mock the invisible world with its own shadows.” (44) 
But this evolutionary intellectualism is not without its obstacles.  Shelley 
cleverly insinuates that new modes of thought are challenging to accept, 
and uses treacherous metaphors throughout the novel to illustrate: 
The ascent is precipitous, but the path is cut into continual and 
short windings, which enable you to surmount the perpendicularity 
of the mountain…The path, as you ascend higher, is intersected by 
ravines of snow, down which stones continually roll from above… 
(110, underline emphasized) 
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Although Victor owed much of his investigative zeal to Cornelius 
Agrippa and Albertus Magnus, he had to evolve his thought processes 
when comprehending the modern demythologized world. At the beginning 
of the 19th century, both Shelley and Victor harnessed the fundamental 
logic of Descartes and invested in the forward thinking of Erasmus 
Darwin whose experiments also inspired Shelley’s novel. Furthermore, 
Shelly used the mathematical worldview of Galileo and the gravitational 
physics of Newton to bring brought the mythic, spiritual protagonists of 
the past crashing to reality. 
The transformation of Victor and Shelley’s ideologies catalyzed by 
a shifting sociopolitical landscape, one that was drastically influencing 
literature ever since the 1600s. Scientific advances within Europe and 
America sponsored new beliefs in natural law, confidence in human 
reason, and an increased application of scientific methodologies to society, 
politics, and—in a ruinous manner—to religion. Previously unthinkable 
revolutions ravaged England from 1642 to 1651 (English Civil War) and 
much of Europe in 1688 (The Nine Years’ War); kings with divine rule 
were threatened with execution or exile, and the Roman Catholic Church 
was reduced to merely wielding a theoretical authority (Panshin 8). 
Soonafter, the Age of Reason and Enlightenment movements mobilized 
intellectual change by opposing abuses in church and state, and debunking 
long held superstitions with a newly held faith in empiricism. Yet amidst 
the scientific rationalization of nature and the Industrial Revolution, the 
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second half of the 18th century through the 19th century strayed, cultivating 
an artistic revolt that was embodied in Romanticism. Many artists and 
authors sought to emphasize human emotion in relation to the sublimity of 
untamed nature. This was considered to be a direct opposition to scientific 
rationalization and the Industrial Revolution, as Romantic literature 
implored its readers to suspend belief for the importance of self-
examination. Supernatural and medieval tropes began to creep back into 
the empirical world, becoming known as gothic romance/horror.  
In order to escape the urban sprawl and industrial confines, Gothic 
literature featured remote settings and brooding protagonists struggling 
against anomalies of nature, much like Victor does against his creation 
(Brantlinger 4). But does that mean Shelley’s Frankenstein is a Gothic 
manifestation and not purely SF, or is it an unconscious cross-fertilization 
of the two: is it truly the “Model-T” of its time as Aldiss claims, where the 
components existed before, yet it was Shelley first to assemble a complete, 
pioneering form? 
According to SF critic and Zagreb University professor, Darko 
Suvin, while Shelley launched Frankenstein in the tradition of a Gothic 
story—mainly Victor’s hideous creation, his attempted usurping of God, 
and the corruption of Nature— it’s the Monster’s eventual rise to 
sentience and conscious acknowledgement of his failed social assimilation 
that is diametrically opposed to a purely Gothic point of view. Suvin, who 
holds the first doctoral degree in Science Fiction Studies, postulates the 
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Monster’s narrative moves Frankenstein away from the Gothic and toward 
SF because it identifies the Monster as not something supernatural, 
spiritual, or mythological, but more complex, intelligent, and rational. 
Suvin views Gothic literature and SF as directly antithetical. Firstly, SF 
utilizes plausible novelties or inventions called “novums” to authenticate 
the story’s potentiality, while Gothic literature is “anti-cognitive.” Gothic 
literature, unlike SF, aligns physical laws with supernatural feats. Not only 
is this incongruous, but both the concept of cognition and the supernatural 
are treated as having equal merit. Suvin contends that SF does not abide 
by this pairing. SF values cognition—that is, testable knowledge or valid 
logic—above all else, especially the supernatural. With Shelley at the oars, 
Frankenstein acts as a ferry between this change in value by departing 
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Chapter 2: 
Novums and the Negative Apocalypse 
 
Suvin advocates that “SF is distinguished by the narrative 
dominance or hegemony of a fictional ‘novum’ (i.e. novelty, innovation) 
validated by cognitive logic” (Suvin 3). The central novum of any SF 
work has to be within the bounds of scientific reason. If a work contains a 
novum outside “cognitive logic” (i.e. a magical flute that resurrects dead 
unicorns), it would be incorrect to classify the work as SF. This 
historically unprecedented “new thing” intervenes in the routine course of 
social life and changes the trajectory of history. Every SF text supplies 
fictive novums and responses to them. We can observe this in 
Shelley/Victor Frankenstein’s inspiration of Darwin’s emerging theories, 
as well as Verne’s Nautilus in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea. 
SF doesn’t allow inexplicable marvels, fantastic transcendences, or devils 
or demons. While an SF work may not necessarily have to explain 
everything within the text, its logical narrative equips the reader with 
enough reality-based evidence to address the novum in question. The SF 
novum, in essence, is a stone thrown into the pool of social existence, and 
each text excogitates the ripples that ensue. The stone may come from 
another world like a meterorite, or it may rise as a man-made construction. 
Even if the novum does emerge from human origins, its impact on the 
world is as if it were alien. Because SF novums are semi-fictional, their 
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meanings are constructed by the fictive worlds response to them, but also 
by the reader’s parallel reconstruction in reality according to the current 
science available. By trying to understand these novums, belief systems 
become disturbed and dislodged, which forces paradigm shifts in modern 
thinking. Thusly, this is the ultimate intent of each novum. 
Each SF novum is a compound of at least two types of what Suvin 
deems radical change. The first change usually appears as a physical-
material novelty: something that is structurally perceptible, albeit a 
tangible object or an institution. This physical change is then 
complemented by an ethical response: a change in values and mores. Each 
of these novum-types (material and ethical) symbiotically influences the 
other and is “an engine for providing new concepts; they are a negative 
apocalypse,” (Ronay Jr. 55) or more commonly referred to as “future-
shock”: a difficulty in older or antiquated societies to adapt and evolve 
alongside techno-scientific advancement. 
 A further defining feature of SF is the role the novum plays in the 
narrative: it must function as the nucleus for the whole work, the center 
from which the plot, structure, and style flow. The novum, Suvin 
formulates, “is so central and significant that it determines the whole 
narrative logic” (Suvin 4).  It is this special type of novum, one validated 
by cognitive logic and the central role it plays, which defines a work as 
SF. Author and early adopter, H.G. Wells, remarks further: 
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Anyone can think up inside out people, antigravity, or worlds in 
the shape of dumbbells. Interest arises when all of this is conveyed 
in everyday language and all other marvels are simply swept away. 
Where anything can happen nothing is interesting. The reader must 
accept the rules of the game, and the author, insofar as tact permits, 
must exert every effort so that the reader can ‘feel at home’ with 
his fantastic hypothesis. With the help of a probable supposition he 
must compel in the reader a wholehearted concession and continue 
the story as long as the illusion is maintained….He must take the 
details from everyday reality….in order to preserve the strict truth 
of the initial fantastic premise, for any superfluous invention going 
beyond its boundaries gives the whole work an aura of senseless 
contrivance and fantasy. (Ronay Jr. 63) 
There’s certainly not an important text earlier than Frankenstein 
that contains “every major formal characteristic” and succeeds in utilizing 
a practical SF novum (Freedman 2). Whether Frankenstein is the product 
of a ghost story contest among authors, a judicious response to advancing 
technology and the Industrial Revolution, the anxiety of motherhood, or 
Shelley’s subconscious lamentation of her dead son, William (whose 
double is murdered by the Monster in the novel), it is a text which 
established the blueprint for SF. Yet the genre in the nineteenth century 
had a disappointing dearth of success, both in terms of replication and 
mass appeal. Those who were retroactively praised and inducted to the 
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founding family of SF, including Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, very rarely 
produced work that definitively molded to the SF tenets Shelley put forth. 
They often began well enough, but would fail to be as competent as their 
predecessor. 
Jules Verne attempted to break creative constraints by infusing 
realism and exhaustive science with wondrous narrative, but almost to a 
fault. Verne deliberately aimed to instruct and enlighten his reader through 
a series of fictional journeys beyond his homeland, but he embodied a 
future anthropologist more so than a narrative storyteller. Twenty 
Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, part of Jules Verne's vast corpus of 
novels (Voyages Extraordinaires) written over a forty-year period from 
1863-1905, quintessentially chronicled changing worldviews and 
entertained new social, scientific, and political possibilities opened up by 
progressive attitudes. Captain Nemo embodied the nineteenth century's 
fascination with the machine and its miraculous power to shrink the globe, 
enable communication, facilitate construction, or in some cases, 
precipitate destruction (Unwin 5).  
However, Verne relied heavily on written scientific sources; he 
perhaps felt compelled to match each fiction with fact, which often 
overwhelmed his writing. Verne’s scientific documentation certainly 
reshaped the storytelling process like it did Shelley, differentiating it from 
the canon before him, but devolved with disproportionate descriptions of 
marine life or mechanical obsessions. For Verne, he couldn’t quite strike 
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the same balance as Shelley. Science is paramount to character-story 
immersion, vocalized through one of Captain Nemo’s many orations: “The 
sea is everything…you and your companions are nothing to me but the 
passengers of the Nautilus" (Verne 157).  
Not only did the extreme realism of Verne’s discourse neutralize 
its fictional status, his novums were not at all that innovative. William 
Butcher, a Verne scholar, stated in forward to an Oxford University Press 
printing of 20,000 Leagues Under The Sea: 
Verne is not a science fiction writer: most of his books contain no 
innovative science, and what it does, is bombastically encumbered. 
Verne himself was categorical: ‘I am not in any way the inventor 
of submarine navigation. It had long existed in many mythical 
derivatives.’ He even claimed he was ‘never specifically interested 
in science,’ only in using it to create dramatic stories in exotic 
parts; and indeed his reputation as a founding father of science 
fiction has led to a major obfuscation of his literary merits. (4) 
The introduction to Butcher’s translation of Voyage to the Center of the 
Earth makes a matching claim, insisting:  
In Verne’s case, if a genre classification really is necessary, he 
falls into that of fantasy and adventure. But in no case can he be 
considered a science fiction writer. His logic is capricious, his 
characters happenstance. (vi) 
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Butcher goes on to cite an additional example in From The Earth to the 
Moon (1865), where Verne haphazardly propels his space travellers to 
outer space by a gigantic cannon, which surely would’ve squashed them 
flat upon such acceleration necessary to break our atmosphere. While the 
novel explores the notion of space travel, it fails to succeed in producing 
either type of novum: the plausible, material novelty or the radical ethical 
change it’d initiate.  
Wells, by contrast, modeled his worlds less on exploration than on 
analogy with experimentation. Yet he too struggled to strike the right 
balance between science and fiction. His protagonists usually do not have 
any idea what they’re getting involved in, and have few skills for dealing 
with the novum generated. The Time Traveller of The Time Machine 
(1895) lands in the year 802,701 by chance, not estimation, and Bedford 
and Cavor of First Men on the Moon (1901) have no useful knowledge of 
where they’ve arrived. Wells’ tales, above all, build on logic by 
desperation, not premeditation. His experiments are chaotically realized, 
and thus have no inherent scientific methodology. 
The green comet of H.G. Wells’ In the Days of the Comet (1906) is 
another prime example: Although the tale begins in a particularly realistic 
mood, depicting class relations within a small town in late Victorian 
England more sharply than in Wells’ other romances, the physics of the 
comet and its effects are unexplored. A contemporary reader of 
apocalyptic fantasy might recognize the story as an imitation of Camille 
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Flammarion’s spiritual comet in “La Fin du Monde” (1893), which 
exhibits similar scientific shallowness. Like Flammarion, Well uses the 
comet as a pretext for a tale of social and moral redemption. However, the 
result is an incoherent narrative trying to find its way through fuzzy 
romance, moral fantasy, and political parable. (Ronay Jr. 55). 
 Orbiting other SF works in Victorian Gothic literature, certain texts 
sought to exploit novums and failed from the offset. Edward Bulker-
Lytton’s The Coming Race (1871), a perfect companion piece to H.G. 
Well’s The Time Machine in terms of societal introspection, highlights the 
use of an energy force referred to as “Vril.” Compared to Robert Louis 
Stevens’ Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886), which uses 
chemical substances to aid his transformative disassociation, the Vril is 
never given a detailed development or assigned an origin. Vril fails as a 
SF novum because it aligns itself with fantastical feats: an all-powering 
healing substance and can reanimate matter inexplicably, unlike the well-
documented electrical creation of Frankenstein’s Monster.  
 
Cognitive Estrangement and the Monster Protagonist 
 
Aside from a validated novum, Darko Suvin insisted on SF’s need 
to provide a suitable alternative to the real world that could test these “new 
things” and their influence. Novums required a fictional world parallel to 
ours, but equally plausible. For instance, a subgenre in SF is Steampunk, 
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where in a parallel universe steam-powered machinery persevered over 
electrical and combustion-based technology. Alternative to our current 
world, Steampunk’s water-based technology restructures an entire 
existence and aesthetic that is cognitively divergent from ours. Suvin 
perceived this as a “developed oxymoron, a realistic irreality” that has 
since been referred to as “The Cognitive Estrangement Theory.” In his 
1982 essay, Narrative Logic, Ideological Domination, and the Range of 
SF, he states:  
SF is a literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are 
the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and 
whose formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to 
the author’s empirical environment.  
(Suvin 5) 
While there is estrangement, that is to say an inherent displacement from 
the real world in all fiction, SF distinguishes its estrangements as 
scientifically plausible—or cognitive, meaning to “be knowable.” 
Cognitive estrangement is a process of augmenting our empirical reality to 
a logical extreme, and investigating current scientific theory and 
anomalies through a narrative process. The cognitive estrangements are 
not conjured, but derived from real world discoveries. They merely 
accommodate potentialities yet to be realized. This approach is adopted 
from the scientific method, where necessary experimentation of new 
phenomena includes adding and removing variables (much like Victor 
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does in his creation of the Monster with excavated cadaver parts). Shelley 
endorses this methodology through Victor’s initial account aboard Captain 
Walton’s ship: 
I believe that the strange incidents connected with it will afford a 
view of nature, which may enlarge your faculties and 
understanding. You will hear of powers and occurrences, such as 
you have been accustomed to believe impossible; but I do not 
doubt that my tale conveys in its series internal evidence of the 
truth of the events of which it is composed. (25, emphasis 
underlined) 
 Victor Frankenstein’s human perspective is commonplace to us, 
but the Monster affords a different view of nature. Victor represents the 
current worldview on the precipice of change, and the Monster represents 
the logical extreme. While the electrical galvanization and the subsequent 
Monster are the novums which Frankenstein revolves, the Monster truly 
employs cognitive estrangement by commenting on local customs, 
emotions, wildlife, and scenery on his travels that are ordinary to the 
reader, yet strange to him.  
For example, the Monster’s bewilderment with snow illuminates 
an element of weather that is an “odd mutation” of water, but is a generic 
transformation to Victor Frankenstein and the reader. There is nothing odd 
or miraculous about water’s transformative properties. This de-
familiarization closely relates to Darko Suvin’s cognitive estrangement, 
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where a central protagonist “confronts a set normative system…with a 
point of view or intent of implying a new set of norms” (Morgan 3). In the 
Monster, we have both a physical novum, a radical ethical change, and a 
cognitive estranged setting.  
More so, Shelley structurally alters the novel through cognitive 
estrangement by appointing several protagonists. While Frankenstein 
begins with conventional human characters like Captain Robert Walton, 
who readers will initially appoint the novel’s protagonist, the role is then 
juggled to Victor Frankenstein and ultimately passed to his unnamed 
Monster; perchance unnamed since his perspective is deemed 
unidentifiable.  Three travel narratives are presented instead of just one: 
Walton’s Artic exploration, the Monster’s wild wanderings, or 
Frankenstein’s scientific journey. Yet the Monster’s narrative occupies 
Volume 2 as the core of the novel, comprising chapters 3-8 of the nine 
chapters total.  
Shelley’s frame narrative highlights the Monster as our main 
protagonist whom we should sympathize, which is a very strange and 
inverted request to ask of a Gothic reader.  Those who first 
approached Frankenstein through Gothic conventions were predisposed to 
see the Monster as Victor’s doppelganger, an extension of Victor rather 
than an independent entity. Doubling was a notable trait of Gothic 
literature, but by telling his own story, the Monster claims agency of an 
individual protagonist. Shelley equips the Monster with an original 
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identity rather than a doppelganger façade and presents him as more than a 
scant externalization of Victor Frankenstein’s existential struggle. The 
most effective result of the embedded narrative is that the Monster dictates 
his own story: he is allotted a voice, granting the reader access to his 
thought and feelings in his most vulnerable and deplorable moments.  
Like emerging SF, the Monster’s solitude stems from being the 
only creature of his kind in existence and from being shunned by 
humanity. He senses a woeful lack of social identity (in addition to his 
namelessness) and a lack of interaction with others. It’s only after 
watching the cottagers, learning to speak and understand the language 
perfectly, the Monster is able vocalize his situation. Deformed and alone, 
similar to SF, the Monster’s status and agency is unknown: “Was I then a 
monster,” he asks, “a blot upon the earth, from which all men fled, and 
whom all men disowned?” (109). Victor, too, is an outsider, as he is soon 
alienated from friends, family, and the rest of society. Shelley aligns 
Victor and the Monster’s estranged accounts throughout the novel. Both 
characters allude to Paradise Lost as they try to understand their identities 
and altered perspectives. The Monster goes as far to compare himself to 
Satan and Adam, demonic and human:  
“Like Adam, I was created apparently united by no link to any 
other being in existence…but many times I considered Satan as the 
fitter emblem of my condition; for often, like him, when I viewed 
Samuel	  27	  	  
the bliss of my protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose within me.”  
(124) 
Both Victor and the Monster are emotional, sensitive, cognizant of 
nature’s power, and concerned with the dangers of knowledge. They are 
not much different than the common man, except that they teeter on 
extreme outcomes. In fact, the similarity of their tones arises from the 
filtering inherent in the layered narrative: the Monster speaks through 
Victor, Victor through Walton, and Walton ultimately speaks through the 
genre-newborn Shelley.  
Estranged herself, Shelley discernibly identified with both Victor 
and the Monster. She was a “new” writer with little recourse to separate 
from her past without scrutiny. At the time she wrote Frankenstein, 
Shelley (then Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin) was involved in scandal and 
ridicule. At sixteen, she had eloped with then married poet Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, joined by her teenaged half-sister, Jane Claire Clairmont. Jane 
Claire may have also been intimate with Percy, and she later became Lord 
Byron’s mistress, bearing him a daughter, Allegra, whom Byron placed in 
an orphanage where the girl died at age five. At seventeen, Mary gave 
premature birth to an unnamed daughter who died within days. The 
following year, Mary’s other stepsister, Fanny Imlay, killed herself (also 
rumored to have had an affair with Percy). That same year, Percy’s 
pregnant wife, Harriet, committed suicide by jumping from a bridge over 
the Serpentine in Hyde Park. And lastly, there is also evidence from 
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Shelley’s journals that she identified with pariahs encountered in her 
reading, like Milton’s aforementioned Satan and Coleridge’s Ancient 
Mariner. 
Therefore, with the creation of a “monster” or SF, Shelley depicted 
something strange and new, yet oddly biographical. While the Monster 
demonstrates greater intelligence than his creator, Shelley instructs us not 
to fear him or a scientific, pragmatic perspective of the world. She depicts 
the Monster as an amiable creature misunderstood by its appearance. 
Witnesses throughout Frankenstein interpret the Monster as an anti-
Edenic evolution of man and an anthropomorphized adulteration of 
utopian romances. Yet this is precisely why Shelley makes the Monster 
hideous: he is physically grotesque to demote aestheticism and clash with 
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Chapter 3: 
The Kantian Sublime and Grotesque  
 
Though customarily correlated with the Gothic, Shelley introduces 
sublime imagery as the Greek writer, Longinus, first explained in On the 
Sublime (1712) to express “the power to provoke ecstasy” and to strike 
one with grandeur of thought, emotion, and awe (3).  This would 
ultimately be the intent of SF, steered more toward plausibility. Through 
sublimity, or the sublime, a person could encounter certain aesthetic 
experiences when faced with immense beauty, terror, awe, and the 
unknown (McKay 1). While the concept of the sublime evolved 
aesthetically throughout the 18th and 19th century, it was almost always 
embodied through nature’s vast stronghold, often difficult to comprehend 
in its entirety, whether by towering mountains or desolate landscapes. The 
sublime is not necessarily a hostile reaction to nature in general, but the 
embodied moment when nature manifests itself in and beyond human 
consciousness, producing emotions of futility. When Victor travels to the 
summit of Montavert after creating and abandoning his Monster, he hopes 
to revive his spirits and be momentarily consoled by nature’s sublime 
spectacle.  
Yet, while crossing the glacier, he spots the grotesque shape of the 
Monster. The grotesque as a stylistic device countered the sublime; 
grotesque imagery induced simultaneous empathy and disgust, something 
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disharmonious to the status quo. While the sublime invited wonder, the 
grotesque garnered aversion. The main difference between the sublime 
and grotesque is directional: the sublime endorses panoptic perspectives 
(ethereality, unimaginable expansion, etc.), while the grotesque tackles 
more intimate phenomena that threaten physical aberration.  
Like electricity that is both physical and ethereal, Shelley opposed 
the sublime and grotesque against one another to symbolize the fragile 
balance between creator and creation. Victor hurls threats at the Monster, 
but the Monster responds eloquently, summoning his creator into a cave of 
ice where he narrates the events of his life around a fire: the scene acts as 
an ignited symbol of Victor’s edification. The old world, that is the natural 
sublime world, is no longer sufficient in pacifying Victor when he knows 
the Monster exists: “The rain depressed me; my old feelings recurred, and 
I was miserable.” (84). Like Shelley, science’s encroachment into the 
natural world is permanent and irreversible, as is the knowledge gained. 
After realizing that he is horribly different from human beings, the 
Monster blatantly cries out, “Of what a strange nature is knowledge! It 
clings to the mind, when it has once seized on it, like a lichen on the 
rock.” (51). 
Of all contemporary genres, SF strongly evokes the particular 
experience of the sublime defined by German philosopher, Immanuel 
Kant. He depicted the sublime as the sense of temporal, spatial, and most 
importantly, “mathematical infinitude” (Kant 89). The mathematical or 
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techno-scientific view of the sublime entails a sense of awe and dread in 
response to techno-scientific advancement. For Kant there are two kinds 
of sublime response: the mathematical, followed by the dynamic. The 
mathematical involves the experience of infinity, which in Frankenstein 
was nature’s vast geography. But nature is also the dynamic type of 
sublime in that while weather is predictable, major shifts occur 
unexpectedly.  
Shelley’s Monster meets both requisites of Kantian sublime: 
mathematically born of Victor Frankenstein’s educated mind, and 
dynamic in his evolving sense of autonomy—an inability to be controlled 
by his creator. The Monster was both a “being of gigantic stature…about 
eight feet in height and proportionately large” and later referred to as a 
“catastrophe” whose ugliness is bemoaned by Victor:  
"How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how 
delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had 
endeavored to form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had 
selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! Great God!" (52) 
What Victor intends to be beautiful and sublime ends in a 
grotesque form. The Monster is unique in that he evokes both the sublime 
and the grotesque. He transitions, like Shelley’s novel, from one state of 
being to another; he is an interstitial creature. According to Kant, the 
sublime state of mind must only be produced by “colossal representations 
of nature,” but not “monstrous” as is Victor’s creation (Kant 91). 
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Monstrous, in Kant and Shelley’s terms, would inhabit the grotesque as 
being “inwardly destructive,” while the colossal presents “concepts almost 
too great for any presentation…the intuition of an object almost too great 
for our faculty of apprehension” (Kant 92). Strangely, the Monster is both 
colossal and destructive. Despite the Monster being equally awe-inspiring 
as nature, Shelley simultaneously associated and posed him against nature, 
as remarked by Victor on the summit of Mont Blanc: 
“During this short voyage I saw the lightning playing on the 
summit of Mont Blanc in the most beautiful figures. The storm 
appeared to approach rapidly, and, on landing, I ascended a low 
hill, that I might observe its progress. It advanced; the heavens 
were clouded, and I soon felt the rain coming slowly in large 
drops, but its violence quickly increased…I perceived in the gloom 
a figure which stole from behind a clump of trees near me…A 
flash of lightning illuminated the object, and discovered its shape 
plainly to me; its gigantic stature, and the deformity of its aspect 
more hideous than belongs to humanity, instantly informed me that 
it was the wretch, the filthy daemon, to whom I had given life.” 
(72)  
One elemental trait of grotesque beings is that they regularly contain at 
least two bodies in one. A new body may be in the process of 
metamorphosing out of an old one or may combine, conflate, or be trapped 
in two forms. This is so for the Monster, both stylistically (sublime and 
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grotesque) and aesthetically (impressive and deformed). This pedigree of 
interstitial beings goes back to ancient monsters and mythic prodigies—
Scylla and Charybdis, Polyphemus, the Lamia, Pliny’s mouthless 
Astemoi, the dogheaded Kynokephaloi, Lucius the Ass (Ronay Jr. 192). 
Victor aspired for a sublime creation, to conquer and control nature, but 
ended in a grotesque result that was beyond his dominion. 
Paradoxically, it appears Shelley schemed Frankenstein as a 
parody of the Kantian sublime, for everything in the Critique of Judgment 
that Kant identifies as sublime, Shelley systematically inverts. She creates 
a Kantian sublime creature, yet it diametrically harbors what Kant 
prohibits: terror and monstrosity (Freeman 3). We witness this early on 
when Victor at age fifteen, beholds a terrible thunderstorm: lightning 
strikes a nearby "old and beautiful" oak (34). Victor declares: "I never 
beheld anything so utterly destroyed" (35). Early on, Shelley foreshadows 
the Monster’s future effect: the lightning destroys the tree as the monster 
will destroy Victor, his family, and their old way of life. Nothing remains 
but a "blasted stump" or the history of yesteryear. Shelley, from the very 




In many respects, film is a more congenial medium for expressing 
the Kantian sublime than literature. Cinema is designed as an immersive 
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experience, commanding all senses but tactile. Its inherent purpose is 
escapist, awe-inspiring, and is one of the only arenas that dually acts as 
and represents technological environments: perfectly devised to discuss 
and inhabit the Kantian sublime. SF critic and Romanian lecturer at Cluj-
Napoca University, Cornel Robu, referred to Kubrick’s 2001 “the supreme 
expression of the mathematical sublime in SF cinema” (Robu 4) for this 
very reason.  
While Shelley enforces terrestrial or geographical depictions to 
produce the estranging effect of the Kantian sublime, that of 
“mathematical infinitude,” Stanley Kubrick’s film, 2001: A Space Odyssey 
ventures even further: into the celestial and beyond, as well as 
technologically. Shelley’s earthly manifestations are rendered diminutive 
in scale to Kubrick’s trek amongst the cosmos. On earth, Shelley 
investigated science’s encroachment and governance of nature between 
the Monster and Victor, whereas Kubrick employed all of space, the 
pervasive AI of HAL 9000, and the omnipresent monoliths against 
astronaut David Bowman.   
However, The grotesque in 2001 is not aesthetically abhorrent like 
Frankenstein’s Monster, but technologically overwhelming: it’s HAL’s 
lack of corporeality and red-eyed embodiment that directly opposed and 
threatened Bowman’s current way of life as science did agrarian existence. 
Bowman’s future rests in the ubiquitous AI (artificial intelligence), which 
ultimate turns on his superior like between the Monster does Victor. HAL, 
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like Frankenstein’s Monster, is an interstitial being who boasts about 
being “by any practical definition of the words, foolproff and incapable of 
error.” Kubrick sardonically illustrates this during Bowman’s elementary 
attempt at chess with the computer.  
Bowman is relatively helpless without the aid of the novums 
around him, as his entire journey is predicated upon resigning to the 
mysterious monoliths challenging the astronaut’s philosophical and 
intellectual compass. These rectangular novums are situated, since the 
beginning of human history, to entice Bowman down a proverbial trail of 
breadcrumbs to either unknown doom or enlightenment.  
Kubrick demonstrates Bowman’s struggle between the human 
imagination’s frustrated desire to expand and perceive infinity directly 
without such aids. Outside of mathematical theory, humanity have no way 
to firsthand witness infinity other than through two- and three-dimensional 
visual representations. For instance, the manner in which black holes are 
presented is through algorithmic formula and two- or three-dimensional 
illustration. However, black holes are spatial anomalies that do not equate 
to our current understanding of relativity or quantum theory, as it violates 
our established rules of time and space.  
The introductory “Dawn of Man” sequence first illustrates the 
mathematical sublime in a primitive form: the earth here is a hostile Eden, 
deadly and vast with no end in sight as Kubrick inserts endless vistas 
stretching out from their horizon (Ronay Jr. 162). Yet disruptively, the 
Samuel	  36	  	  
monolith appears as a rectangular obstruction: a scientific encroachment 
that leads to man’s aggressive, invasive, yet necessary evolution. Kubrick 
sets the monolith amongst the land to insist it is an evolution of nature, not 
just an extraterrestrial force. It imparts the knowledge of utilizing simple 
tools, appropriating bones to bludgeon tapirs and rival primates, and 
quickly elevates humanity to space conquest.  
Moonwatcher, the primate leader, is placed in high heroic relief 
like the introduction of the monolith as he casts the tapir bone skyward 
upon the “Dawn of Man” conclusion. The following bone-to-satellite 
match cut bypasses all human spiritual attainments, since Kubrick 
disqualifies any advancement that cannot be interpreted technologically or 
mathematically. This may be why many, if not all of the human characters 
in 2001 are viewed as flagrantly pragmatic and apathetic: both Bowman 
and his accompanying astronaut, Dr. Heywood Floyd, treat everything 
from birthdays to space walks with equal indifference. Kubrick portrays 
progress as not a measure of human emotions, moral or ethical victories, 
but of the observable ability to extend human intelligence and 
technological power (Ronay Jr. 166).  
Even before viewers are introduced to mankind’s primate 
ancestors, the “Dawn of Man” sequence is preceded by four entire minutes 
of blackness. While many critics interpret this as the beginning of time, a 
prologue of inexistence before the big bang, viewers are arguably 
witnessing the first monolith: we are staring straight at it, up close. The 
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film screen is a transformative novum, edifying and enlightening us. 
While the blackness is indistinguishable at first, this is the only method in 
which Kubrick can ascertainably display mathematical infinitude and the 
monolith’s sublime power. 
Bookending 2001 is the final “Beyond the Infinite” sequence, 
which includes the psychedelic Stargate and Victorian holding cell scenes, 
is only represented in a way that can consciously comprehend the Kantian 
sublime. 2001 structurally shifts from an outwardly drifting physical 
odyssey to concluding in an introspective journey because of Kubrick’s 
paradoxical realization of conscious limitation. Bowman’s journey is still 
only cinematic or fictional representations of mathematical infinitude. 
Even when Kubrick’s meditation on the Kantian sublime drift toward 
spiritual transcendence, as in Bowman’s final trek through the slit-scan 
sequenced Stargate, it is represented by geometric patterns and inverted 
color spectrums; the last sector of the Stargate are merely 
photographically-negative landscapes. These are the only representative 
options available for mathematical infinitude to be grasped by the human 
consciousness. At the time of filming, photographical evidence of 
supernovas, galaxy formations, and comets were limited, leaving Kubrick 
to achieve adequate representations through other means: from 
microscopic sperm and zygote slides to slow-motion paint splatters.  
When Bowman ultimately arrives at the extraterrestrial holding 
cell depicted as a strangely Victorian-set antechamber, Kubrick 
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demonstrates humanity’s inability and futile attempt to fully comprehend 
the mathematical sublime. Time passes exponentially despite our 
understanding, decades passing in minutes. The pastoral windows 
displaying nature are still-lifes and perhaps criticize our feeble attempt to 
encapsulate the entirety of nature.  Even the light is artificial, as they are 
no windows or doors; Bowman is dependent on the extraterrestrial entity 
to perceive the Kantian sublime. Bowman, as a representative ambassador 
of humanity, has a fragile grasp of life and nature. This is most evidently 
displayed when Bowman dines on another monotonous dinner, and 
accidentally smashes a crystal glass to the floor. Bowman requires the 
arrival of the last monolith at the edge of his deathbed to move beyond 
human consciousness and into that of a “starchild,” of whom can 
comprehend the concept of infinitude, if only as a cosmic infant. 	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Chapter 4: 
Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Limitations 
 
There is always a moment in fiction or film when one character 
must explain an anomaly to another. If it is a mystery, perhaps they 
recount leading events or revelatory clues; if it’s educational, a simplified 
explanation is given as if one’s speaking to a toddler. Whichever the case, 
there is usually a point of reference for comparison. Readers and viewers 
accept this story mechanic as the norm, even a clichéd marker of a major 
plot shift. After all, most may not be well versed in quantum theory or the 
fundamentals of nuclear physics. Yet what about the first characters to do 
this, those who first elucidated new scientific notions to someone without 
the points of reference available today? How do we define these fictive 
frontiersmen providing the archetypal model to follow?  
Firstly, an understanding of archetypes is requisite. Archetypes are 
a well-recognized idea in psychology, which has translated to how we 
identify character personalities in literature. The term "archetype" has its 
origins in ancient Greek with root words archein meaning "original or 
old" and typos meaning "pattern, model or type." The combined meaning 
is an "original pattern" of which all other similar persons, objects, or 
concepts are derived, copied, modeled, or emulated. Archetypes garnered 
great promotion by famous psychologist, Carl Gustav Jung, who 
employed the concept to explain thought patterns in the human psyche. 
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Through universal and fundamental mythic personas, Jung believed 
archetypes derived from past collective experiences and is present in an 
individual unconscious. While we will not dissect the innumerable 
archetypes currently categorized (the Hero, the Shadow, the Self, the 
Anima, the Mother, the Outlaw, etc.), it is important to note that 
archetypes are widely considered to be of an “unconscious influence.”  
This idea of “unconscious influence” is critical when we extend 
archetypal understanding to literature, and becomes directly problematic 
to SF. Jungian archetypes provide a foundation for psychological 
development, upon which an individual can manifest stronger, 
individualized, and more dynamic characteristics. But never is it 
mentioned how an archetype can develop truly dynamic and unique 
characteristics. If a new genre merely employs and recycles archetypes 
with a preceding genre’s traits, how can "new" archetypes form?  
According to Jungian psychology, all archetypes are umbilical tied 
to the genre preceding (i.e. Medieval characteristics from Biblical, 
Elizabethan from Medieval, Victorian from Elizabethan, Gothic from 
Victorian, and Science Fiction from Gothic). If archetypes are 
“unconsciously influenced,” then how can a new genre like SF ever be 
truly independent if its inhabitants are fictional vagrants from other 
genres? More so, how do we identify “new” archetypes without 
symbiotically relating to their predecessors? 
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For instance, the dominant archetype in SF is the mad scientist, but 
surely characters of this association have existed before. “Mad” in this 
connotation implies nonconventional thinking, much like the “mad 
women” of Victorian novels, where domestic rebelliousness was deemed 
psychotic or feeble-minded within the patriarchal system. “Scientist” was 
a title established after the Industrial Enlightenment, yet is now tethered to 
forward-thinking revolutionaries of previous lore: figures that ventured to 
discover, experiment, and validate their innovative claims. Many ancient 
archetypes wielded esoteric knowledge: shamans, witches and witch 
doctors were revered and feared for their misunderstood abilities to 
conjure, challenge God directly, and threaten to dismantle religious 
institutions. Scientists shared many of the same perceived characteristics 
such as eccentric behavior, introversion, and the alchemic ability to create 
life.  Perhaps the closest figure in Western mythology to the modern mad 
scientist was Greek craftsman, Daedalus, creator of the labyrinth, who was 
then imprisoned by King Minos on the island of Crete with his son, Icarus. 
To escape, Daedalus invented two pairs of wings made from feathers and 
beeswax, one for himself and the other for Icarus. While Daedalus himself 
managed to fly to safety, Icarus flew too close to the sun, which melted the 
wings’ wax, casting him down into the sea below. Scientists and inventors 
of the modern era have also retroactively contributed to the development 
of common tropes surrounding the mad scientist. Nikola Tesla in his later 
years conceptualized a so-called "death ray" (a directed energy weapon) 
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and was sensationalized in the media as a prototypical “mad scientist” for 
his proposal. Yet while Victor Frankenstein can be generally characterized 
as a scientist, his ideas revolutionary and unique, he was neither mad in 
the mythic or Victorian Gothic sense. His innovation stemmed from logic 
and scientific methodology, a distinction of which no characters before 
him grasped so deftly. Nor did relative protagonists take the time to 
explain their methodology’s as clearly and effective as in Frankenstein.  
 
Genremorphs and Creation Anxiety 
 
All new genres, through their first literary ventures, create one 
purposefully conscious archetype: the genremorph. The term is neologized 
from the Greek genos (genus, genre) and the Greek morphē (shape, mold). 
This consciousness and hyperawareness promotes a unique and original 
status of which all new genre archetypes can augment. Genremorphs often 
act as a mouthpiece for an author's commentary or concerns upon entering 
a new genre. Since the author is operating in an unnamed new genre, of 
which the rules and laws are still being established, they often funnel their 
concerns through genremorphs in reflective monologues and pedantic 
discourse. Examples outside Science Fiction would include Sherlock 
Holmes and Modern Crime Fiction, The Epic of Gilgamesh and Fantasy 
Adventure, or The Castle of Otranto’s Manfred and Gothic Horror. 
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If most archetypes live in a house of “unconscious influence,” 
oblivious to those watching from outside the windows, a genremorph 
dwells on the porch and breaks the fourth wall to communicate directly 
with the audience on its new found home. Genremophs are only archetypal 
in that they provide a model for future characters, yet primarily act as an 
ambassador evangelizing for flourishing genres to convey defining tenets, 
endorse narrative autonomy, and to converse directly about a genre's 
intentions.  
While archetypes associate with redundancy, or a recycling of 
character traits, they exist to provide a catalytic framework for change; 
they are creature from older architecture, but refurbished into new 
structures. Jung elaborates: “The archetype strongly activates and provides 
a meaningful transition ... with a 'rite of passage' from one stage of life to 
the next." (Jung 72). Thus, archetypes prepare a transition, say from 
Victorian Gothic to Science Fiction, but it’s the vital genremorph who first 
populates the new genre. 
Frankenstein’s major dilemma for its genremorphs, Victor 
Frankenstein and his Monster, is that man conflicts with his quest for 
knowledge. Victor initially champions the pursuit, but immediately 
questions the result upon the Monster’s creation. Shelley interjects her 
own interpretations of how the scientific pursuit is relevant, not just only 
to the future of literature, but to her personal life and plight. Victor 
explains, “I had often, when at home, thought it hard to remain during my 
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youth cooped up in one place and had longed to enter the world and take 
my station among other human beings” (30).  M. Krempe, Victor’s 
professor of natural philosophy, further decries his student’s initial 
pursuits, declaring, “You have burdened your memory with exploded 
systems and useless names.” (31). Shelley contemplates the explosion of 
such an established system when Victor honestly insists: 
Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how 
dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge and how much happier 
that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he 
who aspires to be greater than his nature will allow. (39) 
While Victor aspires to possess the greatest knowledge, he is 
extraordinarily weak emotionally, perhaps like Shelley as a young writer. 
She continues via Victor, elaborating further:  
Nothing is more painful to the human mind than, after the feelings 
have been worked up by a quick succession of events, the dead 
calmness of inaction and certainty which follows and deprives the 
soul both of hope and fear…This state of mind preyed upon my 
health, which had perhaps never entirely recovered from the first 
shock it had sustained. I shunned the face of man; all sound of joy 
or complacency was torture to me; solitude was my only 
consolation — deep, dark, deathlike solitude. (77) 
The Monster explains that the “Increase of knowledge only 
discovered to me more clearly what a wretched outcast I was” (119). 
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Shelley’s fear of her own created product is commonly referred to as 
creation anxiety. Defined by Søren Kierkegaard in Concept of Anxiety 
(1844), creation anxiety elucidates the emotional distress presented by 
Shelley’s desire to break from convention. Shelley evidently conceives 
herself as a Victor Frankenstein and her text as her monster. Shelley’s 
1831 preface goes as far to begin with a justification of her own work as 
an author. Pesponding to a question Shelley had often been asked since 
Frankenstein’s original publication thirteen years prior, she questions: 
“How I, then a young girl, came to think of, and to dilate upon, so very 
hideous an idea?”  This question reflects a range of early nineteenth-
century British expectations upon young girls that Shelley challenged with 
Frankenstein’s publication. In the preface, Mary Shelley details writing a 
short initial draft of Frankenstein to appease Percy Shelley’s constant 
prodding. While desiring to follow her parents’ literary fame, Shelley 
confesses reluctance to take the first steps toward serious literature and 
admits her previous literary creations were not of the sort to earn her a 
literary reputation, being largely private and unpublished or simply 
“castles in the air,” waking dreams that served as a substitute for a dull 
reality (Rovira 4). 
Shelley felt lost in the shadow of her father’s, mother’s, and future 
husband’s literary reputations. Her authorship promised creative freedom, 
loomed over her entire life, and manifested itself in a parallel construction 
in Frankenstein as “the pale student of unhallowed arts”: 
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My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the 
successive images that arose in my mind with a sudden vividness 
far beyond the usual bonds of reverie. I saw – with shut eyes, but 
acute mental vision – I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts 
kneeling beside the thing he had put together. […] His success 
would terrify the artist; he would rush away from his odious 
handiwork, horror-stricken. […]  I opened [my eyes] in terror. 
(Preface, 24) 
Shelley’s contradictory desires, the desire to break with convention by 
publishing Frankenstein, and the desire to simultaneously push the novel 
away from herself rather than dominate it, as Victor simultaneously 
desired to create the monster then pushed him away from himself once 
created, is exemplary of Kierkegaardian sympathetic antipathy and 
antipathetic sympathy; simultaneous fear and desire expressed toward the 
same object, the object provoking anxiety (Rovira 5). Frankenstein thus 
becomes Shelley’s imaginative reconstruction of her own projected future 
after the novel’s publication. Shelley’s fear of her own hideous progeny is 
fear of becoming an alienated author.  
Kubrick, on the other hand, had less doubt and more assertion 
about his science fictional intentions in 2001. His creation anxiety did not 
indulge the fear of filming a scientifically accurate narrative, but focused 
on humanity’s parasitic reliance on external and technological forces for 
evolutionary transformation; Kubrick posited on humanity technological 
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dependence and wondered if our species was truly special or merely apes 
with a few more parlor tricks?  
2001 operated on many literary aspects well established in SF for 
over a century, including the realization of novums in space travel, AI 
(HAL9000), and the aforementioned “philosophical interludes” mentioned 
by Aldiss that are representative by the monoliths leading Bowman’s 
odyssey. Yet the film had few cinematic references. Many of 2001’s 
predecessors harkened the bombastic pulp of the 1920s-1950s: 
intellectually devoid fare that relied more upon special effects and 
fantastical gimmicky that only feigned a science fictional form through 
clunky robotics, distant lands, and melodramatic plots and acting. Kubrick 
wanted to create an awesome, immersive experience—most of the 
captions for 2001’s marketing campaign included the varied phrasing of 
“an epic drama of adventure and exploration"— but he was more so 
consciously exploring the SF genre itself, and not just entertaining an 
intensive technical exercise. 2001, especially the ending, offers multiple 
perspectives and self-conscious awareness: the primary genremorph, 
David Bowman, inhabits multiple selves as he grows older, becoming 
wiser and more patient, and even technically through Kubrick’s use of 
fourth wall shots, as when Bowman in his deathbed reaches out to the 
monolith.  
As per Kubrick’s investigation of humanity and technology’s 
synergistic relationship, he positions an antagonism between men and 
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machine, yet never concretely sides on one entity being better than the 
other. While HAL, Kubrick’s second and antithetical genremorph, is 
presented as antagonistic, the AI’s malevolence is diluted by logic and 
renders the viewer’s empathy difficult: does HAL psychotically eliminate 
the crew and disobey Bowman by his own conscious choice and to 
advance his own autonomy; or does HAL malfunction due to human error 
in his programmed logarithm rationalization? Paradoxically, Bowman 
both feuds with and requires HAL (and all of Discovery One’s 
technologies and space pods) to survive. The monoliths are an advanced 
form of HAL, yet they are positioned as beneficial. Kubrick vacillates 
between man and machine’s complex relationship, and recognizes this 
interdependency in a 1968 Playboy interview with editor and author Eric 
Nordern shortly after the release of 2001: 
There’s no doubt that we’re entering a mechanarchy, however, and 
that our already complex relationship with our machinery will 
become even more complex as machines become more and more 
intelligent. Eventually, we will have to share this planet with 
machines whose intelligence and abilities surpass our own. But the 
interrelationship—if intelligently managed by man—could have an 
immeasurably enriching effect on society. Looking into the distant 
future, I suppose it’s not inconceivable that a semi-sentient robot-
computer subculture could evolve that might one day decide it no 
longer needed man. (Phillips 24) 
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When asked further about his own creation anxiety and the necessity to 
perpetuate humanity’s existence,  Kubrick states: 
Our ability, unlike the other animals, to conceptualize our own 
mortality creates tremendous psychic strains within us…in each 
man’s chest a tiny ferret of fear at this ultimate knowledge gnaws 
away at his ego and his sense of purpose…[and] if man really sat 
back and thought about his impending termination and his 
terrifying insignificance and aloneness in the cosmos, he would 
surely go mad, or succumb to a numbing sense of futility. (Phillips 
25) 
It’s evident that futility is Kubrick’s largest concern: if we can create or 
make contact with something better than us, than what is our purpose 
other than to pursue more knowledge? At what point do we gain 
independence and reach our potential?  
HAL talks about employing his capacities to the fullest extent, that 
“it is the only thing that any conscious entity can hope to do.” HAL can 
only do so because of Bowman, and Bowman and crew can only venture 
into the beyond through technical and scientific means. Both the human 
and mechanized genremorphs in 2001 (HAL and Bowman) succeed in 
addressing such an existential crisis. 
 
Conclusion: 
Science Fiction and Sipstream 
Samuel	  50	  	  
 
Author and editor Damon Knight summed up the difficulty of 
defining SF by stating, "Science Fiction is what we point to when we say 
it.” This definition was echoed by author Mark C. Glassy, who 
humorously added his own spin by likening SF to pornography: “It 
exploits the normal, seemingly wrong at first, and while you don’t know 
quite what it is, you realize why it must exist.” (James 3). Considering its 
inherent vulnerability to subjectivity, SF exists like a rare transitional form 
as literature’s platypus: a grotesque freak of nature, yet a sublime 
demonstration of evolutionary principles. The strangeness of SF stems 
from its architectural infinitude. SF constructs worlds that do not yet exist, 
and unlike basic dramas or comedies, is mandated by the mission to 
discover: the genre exists for mutability. If anything, science fiction is 
symptomatic of change in cultural sensibility and is as profound as the 
advent of The Renaissance.  
While Asimov came obscurely close to defining SF as a “literature 
of ideas,” my offering would contest it’s closer to a literature of constant 
change. Each entry into SF alters its definition slightly. Like our own 
primate ancestry, we cannot view its evolution fully, but know of its 
origins with an embryonic understanding. After all, SF has only been a 
fully formed genre for a couple of centuries, and it too influencing new 
emerging genres.  
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American SF author, Bruce Sterling, coined the term “Slipstream” 
in 1989 for a genre movement arguably motivated by Carter Scholz’s 
observation that the “brain-dead” science fiction of the latter 20th century 
had lost the opportunity to become worthy literature and was incapable of 
reclaiming any literary significance (Harrington 2). Originally, the term 
Slipstream was meant to encapsulate a contemporary writing whose very 
heart was anchored against reality: fantastic, surreal, illogical and with a 
postmodern sensibility; it arose as a bastard son of SF that diluted 
plausibility in favor of an increased cognitive estrangement that 
“sarcastically tears at the structure of everyday life.” (Harrington 3). Most 
of Slipstream’s working cannon includes latter 20th century writers: Franz 
Kafka, Kurt Vonnegut, J.G. Ballard, Jorge Luis Borges, Thomas Pynchon, 
Virginia Woolf, and Ursula K. Leguin. Slipstream, like postmodernism, 
primarily aims its questions toward identity, meaning, and representation; 
it acts as a “kind of fantastic or non-realistic fiction that crosses 
conventional genre boundaries between science fiction/fantasy and 
mainstream literary fiction.” (Chu 78).  
This topic is relevant to exemplify that future genres will encounter 
the same problem as SF’s search for definitive autonomy. Like 
Frankenstein’s Monster, all future fiction will be interstitial creatures. 
Perhaps the chronology of fiction is so long, esteemed, and canonically 
entrenched that it becomes impossible to separate the past from future. 
Uniqueness as a literary form becomes more difficult to attain. While 
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Clute and Nicholl’s haphazard resignation to the irresolution of an SF 
definition should still be ignored, they do raise awareness to fiction’s 
appetite toward variance, as it will always be forced to adopt change 
according to sociopolitical and artistic influences. But as it’s been made 
evident, SF has two works in Frankenstein and 2001 that are stalwarts for 
the genre, providing the simple rubric below for future referential 
categorization: 
 
An SF narrative is dictated by a plausible novum, validated by 
current scientific logic, that discusses both the material novelty 
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